ABSTRACT Cloud computing companies need to achieve a balance between service openness and security control to promote the growth of the cloud service business. This paper is a theoretical discussion of the complete service openness condition and the complete security control condition based on Nash equilibrium from the perspective of investment, including investment in service and investment in security by the cloud computing company. The quantitative assessment methods of two conditions are designed based on the investments. A quantitative analysis of the impact of security investments on security control and service openness is presented. Based on this analysis, the optimal security investment for service openness and the minimum complete service openness investment standard are derived. Finally, the relationship between them is analyzed to help cloud computing providers decide the optimal strategy for coordinating investment in both service and security.
I. INTRODUCTION
Cloud computing can provide large-scale, multilevel, highly efficient, and convenient service to users based on their demand [1] , [2] . The cloud service provider constructs infrastructure to support new modern services [3] , [4] which can bring high returns to the service provider. However, a large amount of upfront and sustained investment is inevitable for technology development and operations to ensure the availability of affordable computing resources [5] - [7] . Amazon Web Services (AWS), which accounts for 40 percent of the public cloud market, achieved a profit of $4.3 billion in 2017, more than the pretax profit of the entire company, but also had a negative cash flow of $1.5 billion for facility investment [8] . Therefore, analysis of investment in cloud service is important.
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Since cloud computing is being used to provide many different services to various users, its service-oriented architecture contains numerous open features [9] , [10] . Increased openness of cloud services not only increases users' trust, but also attracts new users, since openness makes it easier to use the service and connect with other services and applications [11] . Cloud service companies make investment to improve openness [12] .
However, openness also brings security problems because abnormal users may take advantage of the openness to attack the system and obtain illegal benefit [13] . Rationally, providers and users have profit-making objectives. To avoid risk, the provider may increase investment in security to improve security detection technology [14] - [16] , so that openness will be tightened. Thus the provider needs to not only maintain service openness but also assure security control to the user, and a good cloud service should find a balance between these two goals. This paper addresses service investment and security investment, and analyzes service openness and security control from the perspective of both. Fig.1 shows the overall structure and logic of this paper.
FIGURE 1.
The overall structure and logic of this study.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 describes the game process of cloud service between provider and user to reflect openness and security, and related work is also reviewed. Section 3 develops the expected utility models based on economic factors and investment perspective. Nash equilibrium is used to deduce the complete service openness condition and the complete security control condition. The methods for assessing the degree of openness and security are outlined in Section 4. Section 5 analyzes the relationship between openness and security, and the optimal investment coordination strategy is also discussed. Section 6 concludes the paper and provides future research directions. All proofs are provided in appendices.
II. THE CLOUD SERVICE PROCESS A. DESCRIPTION OF GAME IN CLOUD SERVICE
In the cloud service environment, a user submits a service request that may be either normal behavior for normal use or abnormal behavior for a malicious intention motivated by more benefit. The service provider decides to either provide or reject the service based on the result of security detection. The provider and user obtain different profits in different strategy sets. Since the provider and user are assumed to be in rational pursuit of profit, a game process is provided in Fig.2 . This paper considers the benign decision strategy, which is that the user displays normal use behavior and the provider provides the service to the user, as the premise of mutualism of provider and user and the foundation of cloud service.
Security detection technology for cloud service is not perfect, so the cloud service system has inherent security vulnerabilities [17] . Security breaches are specifically expressed as two kinds of detection failures: the false-positive failure, in which the security detection system judges the normal user as abnormal, and the false-negative failure, in which the abnormal user is judged as normal [18] , [19] . Both failures would cause harm to a cloud service; the former would result in loss of customer trust, and the latter would result in loss to the provider.
B. LITERATURE REVIEW
Openness and security have been considered important issues in cloud computing. It is widely believed that it is difficult to achieve perfect security just through technological methods [20] . Previous research shows that particular attention should be paid to the influence of incentives in cloud service, for these economic factors affect the decision making and behavior of those in various roles in the information system [18] , [21] , [22] .
In cloud services, there is interaction between system security and service benefit, suitable for studying with game theory [18] , [22] - [27] . Optimal configurations of security investment in information services are analyzed by game [27] , [28] . Furuncu and Sogukpinar [29] assess the security level of cloud service by Confidentiality, Integrity and Availability (CIA) in service schema and further analyze scalable security risk assessment by game theory.
Considering imperfect security detection, Chen et al. [19] proposes a model of user behavior based on incomplete information. The multistage dynamic game model adopts current and historical actions, combined with false-positive and false-negative failures in security detection, to improve the accuracy of detection. Nie and Guo [30] construct a payoff matrix by membership function to discuss user behavior by game theory in multicloud environments. Cao et al. [31] consider information security to build optimal configurations of detection by game theory and analyze the effect of decision failure. However, none of this work considers system openness and the tradeoff it creates with security.
In this paper we consider service investment [32] , security investment [17] , the security breach including two detection faults: the false-positive failure and the false-negative failure [18] , [19] , and discuss the relationship between service openness and security control. Thus, the complete VOLUME 7, 2019 service openness condition, the complete security control condition, and assessment methods of both, as well as the optimal investment coordination strategy for service and security, are obtained.
III. THE MODEL AND CONDITIONS GENERATION A. THE ANALYSIS OF ECONOMIC FACTORS
Based on the above analysis and literature, we identified the following economic factors for provider and user in various decision-making situations.
1) User-related factors
• Normal use profit: The user behaves normally using the cloud service to derive business value, which is the benefit of using cloud service minus payment.
• Illegal benefit: The user behaves abnormally to obtain illegal benefit because of the false-negative failure of security detection.
• Punishment loss: The user gets punished because the cloud service's security detection determines the user to be illegal.
2) Provider-related factors
• Normal service profit: By selling services to the user, the provider obtains normal profit, which is the user's payment minus normal service costs.
• Security loss: The provider suffers loss because of security's false-negative failure to detect abnormal user behavior.
• Reputation loss: The provider suffers tangible or intangible reputation loss because of the false-positive failure of security detection related to normal user behavior.
• Additional profit: The provider generates additional profit by providing services to users, in addition to normal service profit, in the form of additional income minus additional cost.
This paper considers additional income from the investment including service investment that may result from internal investment to increase the availability of affordable computing resources to improve service openness [32] . Additional cost is considered as a security investment used to improve security detection in the service.
B. NOTATION AND ASSUMPTIONS
In the game process, provider a and user i are represented by three tuple G = {N , S, U }, where N = {a, i} is the participant set and D = {d a , d i } is the strategy set of provider and user. The two decisions, to provide or reject service, are expressed as D a = {d a 1 , d a 2 } respectively, and normal and abnormal user behaviors are expressed as
} represents the expected utility of provider and user. The notations used in the model are summarized below in Table 1 . 
C. THE EXPECTED UTILITY
We assume payment schema is pay-per-use (PPU) [33] , which means payment is generated only by providing service. Four cases are identified based on different strategy sets, which are expressed as probability characteristics called background probability. They are represented as the probability of false-positive failure α and false-negative failure β. Therefore, the expected utility is the profit under the background probability. This logic is shown in Fig. 3 (I) Case One: The provider serves the normal-behavior user, which is the benign decision that cloud service pursues. The strategy set is d11 = {d a 1 , d i 1 }. The user obtains the normal use profit E − pk. The security detection correctly identifies the normal user, which means there is no false-positive failure, so the background probability is 1 − α. The expected utility of the user is represented as
Similarly, the pr ovider obtains the normal service profit (p−c)k and the additional profit p add , and the expected utility of provider is represented as u a d11 . u
The provider rejects the abnormal user. The strategy set is d22 = {d a 2 , d i 2 }. The abnormal user is correctly identified, which means there is no false-negative failure, so the background probability is 1 − β. The abnormal user will not have normal use profit E − pk, much less illegal benefit b risk , but also the user will be punished as p risk . The expected utility of the user is represented as u i d22 .
The provider loses all profit, including both the normal service profit (p − c)k and the additional profit p add . The expected utility of the provider is represented as u a d22 .
The provider rejects the normal user because of a false-positive failure of security detection. The strategy set is d21 = {d a 2 , d i 1 } and the background probability is α. Since no service is provided, the user does not obtain normal use profit E − pk, and he also will be wrongly punished p risk as an abnormal user. So, the expected utility of the user is represented as u i d21 .
Similarly, the provider will not obtain the normal service profit (p − c)k or any additional profit p add , and there will be reputational losses p trust . Thus, the expected utility of the provider is represented as u a d21 .
The provider serves the abnormal user because of a false-negative failure of security detection. The strategy set is d12 = {d a 1 , d i 2 } and the background probability is β. The abnormal user will obtain benefit, including both normal use profit E − pk and illegal benefit b risk . So, the expected utility of the user is represented as u i d12 .
The provider obtains the normal service profit (p − c)k, because the user pays for the service despite being an abnormal user because of PPU payment schema. The additional profit p add is also obtained because service has occurred, but a security loss l risk also occurs in this case. Thus, the expected utility of the provider is represented as u a d12 .
EQUILIBRIUM ANALYSIS AND CONDITIONS GENERATION
Based on the above discussion, at a certain macro static time, the strategy set of user and provider is finite, and equilibrium must exist according to Nash's equilibrium existence theorem [34] , [35] . Taking the benign decision as an equilibrium point, regardless of the decisions of provider and user, cloud service has complete service openness and complete security control at the same time.
1) THE COMPLETE SERVICE OPENNESS CONDITION
Irrespective of the user's decision, the provider's decision is to chase more benefit. The expected utility of the provider is u a .
Since the benign decision is an equilibrium point, the set service of the provider is the Pareto optimal. Thus,
. From derivation provided in Appendix A, we can derive that if the service investment meets Eq. (6), the provider will always tend to make a service decision. The complete service openness condition is expressed as follows:
Set value B = z + βl risk − (p − c)k is called the complete service openness investment standard. It is obvious that the increase in security investment z and the security loss, which happened under the false-negative failure βl risk , will increase this standard, whereas the normal service profit of the provider (p − c)k decreases this standard. Eq.(6) can be transformed into w + pk ≥ z + ck + βl risk . It is clear that complete service openness means that the total benefit to the provider is higher than total cost.
2) THE COMPLETE SECURITY CONTROL CONDITION
There is a similar discussion for the user. Rationally, whatever the decision of the provider, the user will chase more benefit. The expected utility of the user is u i .
Take the normal behavior decision of the user as the Pareto
. From the derivation in Appendix B, the following result can be obtained.
If the probability of false-positive and false-negative failure α, β can meet Eq. (8), the user will be forced to adopt normal behavior, as determined by the cloud service's security detection, even though security breaches still exits.
Obviously, β(E −pk +b risk ) is regarded as the total profit in cases with false-negative failures of users who display abnormal behavior, and α(E − pk) is the total profit in cases with false-positive failures of users who display normal behavior. Eq. (8) shows that when the user's expectation of total profit under two security detection failures is smaller than the user's normal profit of E −pk, cloud service can completely compel the user to display normal behavior.
IV. ASSESSMENT METHODS
In reality, conditions of complete service openness and security control are difficult to achieve. This section develops VOLUME 7, 2019 quantitative assessment methods to measure the degree of complete service openness and complete security control when these two conditions are not fully satisfied.
A. THE ASSESSMENT METHOD OF COMPLETE SERVICE OPENNESS
For the complete service openness condition, if service investment is bigger than the complete service openness investment standard w ≥ B, cloud service will reach 100 percent complete service openness. However, in reality complete openness is impossible due to the existence of security issues; When the complete service openness condition cannot be satisfied, it is necessary to find the assessment method O(w) that calculates the degree to which complete service openness is caused by service investment w.
First, suppose the assessment function O(w) = 0%, if w = 0. As the service investment w increases from 0 to the complete service openness investment standard B, the degree is stimulated and increases from 0 percent to 100 percent. When w ≥ B, that is also O(w) = 100%. Therefore, the assessment function O(w) is an incremental function of service investment, that is ∂O/∂w > 0.
Second, for more comprehensive consideration, there are two possible responses when a provider is stimulated by service investment. One type of provider is sensitive. Openness increases rapidly at first because the provider has a positive attitude, but along with a growing service investment, service openness's rate of growth slows because stimulation is weakening. This means the increase in service openness by the sensitive provider shifts from fast to slow, thus bringing a diminishing marginal return on the service investment ∂ 2 O/∂w 2 < 0. The other type of provider proceeds more cautiously, and the trend of increasing service openness is opposite to that of the sensitive provider ∂ 2 O/∂w 2 > 0.
Based on the above, the following exponential function is designed to assess the degree of complete service openness when w ≤ B, which not only reflects increased function, but is able to express sensitivity and caution two attitudes of cloud service provider by different value of parameter θ .
θ (θ ≥ 0) denotes the attitude intensity of a provider facing service investment. 
θ ) is the inflection point. When w ∈ [0, B ln θ] describes the cautious provider, w ∈ [B ln θ, B] describes the sensitive provider. In general, as w increases, it reflects the attitude of the provider changing from cautious to sensitive.
There is a data simulation of the assessment function of the complete service openness. The complete service openness investment standard B is set as 50. The degree of complete service openness is shown in Fig.4 in three different attitude intensities of the provider caused by parameter θ = 0.5, 2, 3 respectively; the greater the intensity, the greater the degree of bending that explains the sensitivity and caution.
B. THE ASSESSMENT METHOD OF THE COMPLETE SECURITY CONTROL
The complete security control condition presents the influence of security control on user behavior. When the condition is satisfied, the user will engage in completely normal behavior in the cloud service, and the degree of security control is complete at 100 percent.
When this condition cannot be reached, a security breach of cloud service is s ∈ [0, 1] [17] , which reflects the degree to which security detection contains both the false-positive failure α and the false-negative failure β. When a security breach occurs in a user's normal behavior, security detection makes the wrong judgment that a normal user is abnormal; this is the false-positive failure. Similarly, a security breach related to a user's abnormal behavior is a false-negative failure. Two failures are expressed by conditional probability P(security breach|normal) = α and P(security breach|abnormal) = β.
Since security breach s contains only these two failure situations, P(normal|security breach) + P(abnormal|security breach) = 1. Let η(0 < η < 1) denote that the proportion of users is normal. Bayes formula is used to get the following: P(security breach|normal) P(normal) + P(security breach|abnormal)P(abnormal) = P(security breach). Thus
Eq.(10) reveals the relationship between the two types of failures and a security breach. The complete security control condition is reflected by two failures by Eq.(8). Combining Eq. (8) and (10), the relation of the security breach s with degree of the complete security control is deduced as follows, (See details in Appendix C).
(
, the complete security control condition has been reached, and the degree of complete security control is 100 percent. This is the case of complete security control. (1 − η), η], the complete security control condition is reached when α * < α < s η and 0 < β < β * , and the degree of complete security control can be calculated by Eq. (11) . Where α * =
(1−η−s)(E−pk)−sb risk (1−2η)(E−pk)−ηb risk and β * = (s−η)(E−pk) (1−2η)(E−pk)−ηb risk , this is the threshold when the complete security control condition is just reached. This is the case of conditionally controlled security.
S(s)
, the complete security control condition is impossible to reach, and the degree of complete security control is zero percent. This is the case of completely uncontrollable security. There is a data simulation of the assessment function. We set the normal use profit of user E − pk = 10, the proportion of normal user η is 0.5, and the illegal benefit of user b risk is 100. The degree to which complete security control changes with a security breach is shown in Fig.5 .
V. THE COMPREHENSIVE ANALYSIS
Service openness and security control are affected by service investment w and security investment z respectively. However, in the complete service openness condition, security investment z also raises the complete service openness investment standard B to affect service openness. Thus, in this paper, security investment z is selected as a juncture point to analyze the relationship between service openness and security control, as well as the coordination strategy with service investment.
A. THE INFLUENCE OF SECURITY INVESTMENT ON SECURITY CONTROL 1) THE INFLUENCE OF SECURITY INVESTMENT ON SECURITY BREACH
Generally, as security investment increases, security breaches s decrease; thereby incidences of false-positive failures α and false-negative failures β also decrease, and the degree of complete security control is improved.
Work by Gordon and Loeb [17] takes into account the relationship between security investment and security breach. The security breach is defined depending on the security investment z and the original vulnerability of security (12) where the parameter λ > 0 is the intensity of security investment on security breach.
Take a data simulation to describe the relationship between security breach and security investment as shown in Fig.6 . Set λ is 0.2. Three kinds of original vulnerability of security are shown by v = 0.3,0.6,0.9. Fig.6 shows that with an increase in security investment, three curves of security breach decrease from original vulnerability to almost zero. The smaller the original vulnerability of security, the faster the reduction of security breach with increased security investment.
The relationship of security breach with two failures is s = αη+β(1−η) and s = v (λz+1) ⇒ v = s/v λz , so v = (α/v λz )η+ (β/v λz )(1−η). Since the original vulnerability of security v is security breach without security investment, that is z = 0 ⇒ s(v, 0) = v. Meanwhile v is also specifically expressed as two kinds of original detection failuresα andβ, that is v = αη +β(1 − η). Therefore, security investment also reduces two failures, as expressed in α/v λz =α ⇒ α =αv λz and β/v λz =β ⇒ β =βv λz . VOLUME 7, 2019 FIGURE 7. The degree of the complete security control changes the security investment.
2) THE INFLUENCE OF SECURITY INVESTMENT ON SECURITY CONTROL
Since Eq. (12) can establish the connection between security breach and security investment, z 0% and z 100% are two critical security investment points that make security breach s reach zero and 100 percent of complete security control. When z = z 0% , s(z 0% ) = η, and when z = z 100% ,
Therefore the degree of complete security control can be measured by security investment as in Eq.(13).
S(z)
Set the original vulnerability v is 0.3; the intensity of security investment λ is 0.2, the proportion of normal user η is 0.5, the normal use profit of user E − pk is 10, and the illegal benefit b risk is 100000. The relation of the degree of complete security control with security investment is shown in Fig.7 .
In any situation, as security investment z increases, the two security detection failures α and β will decrease, the security breach S will decrease, and the security control of system become higher. Therefore, the degree of complete security control is calculated by Eq.(13), which is divided into three interval sections by two critical security investment points z 0% and z 100% . And when z ∈ [z 0% , z 100% ], the degree of complete security control is a non-linear function of security investment z, (See Fig.7 ) which can also be calculated by Eq.(13).
B. THE INFLUENCE OF SECURITY INVESTMENT ON SERVICE OPENNESS 1) THE INFLUENCE OF SECURITY INVESTMENT ON THE COMPLETE SERVICE OPENNESS INVESTMENT STANDARD
The complete service openness investment standard is B = z+βl risk −(p−c)k. It is obvious that increasing security investment z increases the standard. On the other hand, increasing security investment reduces security breaches, so βl risk is also reduced in the standard B. In order to analyze the influence of security investment on the standard B, combining β =βv λz with B = z + βl risk − (p − c)k, the complete service openness investment standard is also expressed by
As seen in Appendix D, there is the optimal security investment for service openness z * =
gets the minimum complete service openness investment standard
− (p − c)k, so that complete service openness is easier to reach.
A data simulation of how the complete service openness investment standard changes with security investment is shown in Fig.8 . The intensity of security investment λ is 0.2, the original false-negative failure probabilityβ is 0.1, the security loss of the provider l risk is 10000, and the normal service profit of the provider (p − c)k is 10. Three kinds of original vulnerability are shown by v = 0.3, 0.6, 0.9 respectively. Fig.8 shows three curves of the complete service openness investment standard B, with a trend of first decreasing but then increasing. This means that initially, as security investment increases, the decrease of the false-negative failure β in security breach s causes B to be lowered, but if security investment continues to increase, B will rise as well. The turning points P1, P2, P3 are the minimum service openness investment standard B * at different original vulnerability v = 0.3,0.6,0.9 respectively. Security investment at the turning point is also the optimal value for service openness because this standard is the lowest at this time.
Meanwhile, when the original vulnerability of security is smaller, both the optimal security investment for service openness and the minimum complete service openness investment standard are also smaller. This is because when the original vulnerability of security v is smaller,βv λz l risk could reach zero faster with increasing security investment. Therefore good security also easily promotes service openness. 
2) THE INFLUENCE OF SECURITY INVESTMENT ON SERVICE OPENNESS
When security investment reaches the optimal for service openness z = z * , the minimum complete service openness investment standard B * is obtained. Fig.9 reflects three situations where the degree of the complete service openness changes with security investments, which sets the data simulation about the intensity of openness as θ is 2, the original false-negative failure probabilityβ is 0.1, the security loss l risk is 10000, and the normal service profit (p − c)k is 10.
In Fig.9 (a), service investment is less than the minimum complete service openness investment standard w < B * , so the degree of service openness cannot reach 100 percent, as calculated by Eq.(9).
In Fig.9(b) , service investment is equal to the minimum complete service openness investment standard w = B * . So the degree of complete service openness just reaches 100 percent at z = z * , which also can be calculated by Eq. (9) at other security investment levels.
In Fig.9 (c), service investment is greater than the minimum complete service openness investment standard w > B * . The degree of complete service openness is 100 percent when z ∈ [z 1 , z 2 ], where z 1 and z 2 are called as the lowest and highest security investment of the complete service openness respectively. z 1 and z 2 can be obtained by w = z + βv λz l risk − (p − c)k. The degree of complete service openness also can be calculated by Eq.(9) at other security investment levels.
C. COMPREHENSIVE ANALYSIS OF SERVICE INVESTMENT AND SECURITY INVESTMENT
Based on the above analysis, two aspects of investment by cloud service providers are clear: investment in both service and security have profound effect on service openness and security control. Combined with these two investments, services and security will be comprehensively analyzed to obtain appropriate investment strategies. In the following analysis, the priority is on concurrently satisfying the best possible standards of both service openness and security control.
Generally, service investment is less than or equal to the minimum complete service openness investment standard, because cloud service has been able to reach complete service openness when service investment is equal to the minimum complete service openness investment standard. Fig.10 shows three situations in which these two investments are analyzed to coordinate service openness and security control.
In Fig.10 (a) and 10(b), the cloud service has achieved complete security control when z ≥ z 100% . And when z = z * , cloud service is also able to achieve complete service openness or make service openness reach the maximum. Thus, the optimal security investment for service openness
is the best security investment from the perspective of both complete service openness and complete security control.
At the same time, the best service investment is the minimum complete service openness investment standard B * =
It is worth discussing that even if VOLUME 7, 2019 FIGURE 10. The degree of the complete service openness and the degree of the complete security control change with the security investment.
current service investment is less than the minimum complete service openness investment standard, in order to get better service openness, it is necessary to increase service investment to make it as close as possible to B * . In Fig.10(c) , complete service openness and security control cannot be satisfied at the same time. In this complex situation, the best security investment needs to be decided according to the different attitudes of providers toward openness and security. Generally, a provider chooses the optimal security investment z from the interval section [z * , z 100% ] (that is [
v(E−pk+b risk ) ]) because the security investment of this interval section achieves relatively balanced service openness and complete security control. And the best service investment is as close as possible to the complete service openness investment standard B * .
The specific optimal security investment can be obtained by combining two assessment methods of service openness with Eq.(9) and security control with Eq.(13), according to their corresponding coordination mechanisms caused by attitude to openness and security of cloud service provider. A simple way is to find the intersection point of two assessment functions in the interval section [z * , z 100% ] to obtain a balance between service and security, and this intersection point can be calculated by combining two assessment functions O(w) = [ 
However, security is usually the most important fact for cloud service companies. From Fig.10(c) , when security investment approaches z 100% , the degree of complete security control rises sharply, while the degree of complete service openness declines slowly. Therefore, the best security investment is more likely to be near z 100% .
VI. CONCLUSIONS
Cloud service should have good service openness for users and strong security control to protect providers. This paper considers these two aspects from the perspective of service investment and security investment. To analyze these two and to obtain optimal investments to coordinate service openness and security control, complete service openness and complete security control conditions are obtained. From these two conditions, assessment methods for complete service openness and complete security control are further developed. The minimum complete service openness investment standard and the optimal security investment for service openness are obtained. Finally, the best service investment and the best security investment are discussed to balance service openness and security control.
First, this paper presents a static approach based on macroanalysis. The expected utility is constructed under the background probability and does not involve a specific time span. Future research could add time factors to analyze the effect of corresponding conclusions, especially the relevant conclusions related to various economic factors parameter that are updated dynamically with time. Second, the specific optimal investment strategy is based on different service and security coordination mechanisms and the attitude of the provider toward openness and security, which will be further studied based on the two assessment methods of this paper. Third, this paper assumes the Nash equilibrium point is benign decisions of cloud service providers and users, thus deriving complete service openness condition and complete security control condition. However, actually these two conditions are almost impossible to achieve, so this paper also designs the assessment method to calculate the degree of achievement, but the Nash equilibrium point of decisions will also change at this time, we will use the evolutionary game to discuss this change in the future work. 
And the additional profit p add contains service investment w and security investment z, so p add = w − z.
It follows Eq.(A1) and (A2) that
And further 
It follows from Eq.(B1) and (B2) that
And further, if and only if equality holds in Eq.(B3) and (B4), then the solution of equations (α 0 , β 0 ) is obtained. According to the Cramer's rule, 11 . The region expression in the security control.
The normal use benefit of user E is higher than the user's payment of them pk, and other economic factors are positive. That is α 0 > 0, β 0 < 0 in Eq.(B5) and (B6). Thus, there is the graph of the security control region shown as Fig.11 . It is easy to find the line of Eq.(B3) under the line expressed by Eq.(B4), and region II is included in region I. If α and β meet Eq.(B3), then Eq.(B4) has been satisfied. Therefore if α(E − pk) + β(E − pk + b risk ) ≤ E − pk, the user exhibits normal behavior.
APPENDIX C TO OBTAIN THE ASSESSMENT METHOD OF DEGREE OF COMPLETE SECURITY CONTROL
Eq.(C1), which came from Eq. (8) , is a linear function about the probability of the false-positive failure α and the false-negative failure β. The relation between the security breach and the false-positive failure α and the false-negative failure β is also a linear function described in Eq. (10) . Fig.12 demonstrates the relationship between these two linear functions to discuss the degree of the complete security control in different situations.
The coordinates of the intersection point I of these two linear functions is (α * , β * ), which can be calculated by Cramer's rule:
FIGURE 12. The schematic of the complete security control with the false-positive failure and the false-negative failure.
Because of α ≥ 0, β ≥ 0, Eq.(C1) and (10) are the line segment in Fig.12 . And region R under the line segment α(E−pk)+β(E−pk+b risk ) = E−pk is the complete security control according to the proof in Appendix B, in which α,β satisfy the complete security control condition. When the security breach decreases two failures α,β also decrease, and the line segment of αη + β(1 − η) = s is close to region R. Therefore the ratio of the length of the part of the line segment of αη + β(1 − η) = s entering region R to the length of the entire line segment is the degree of the complete security control.
It is easy to get the coordinates of the upper endpoint B, (0, Fig.12 .
Generally, the illegal benefit of user b risk is more than the normal use profit of user E − pk, and the proportion of normal behavior user η is greater than abnormal behavior, so
Therefore, the slope of the line α(E − pk) + β(E − pk + b risk ) = E − pk is bigger than the slope of the line αη + β(1 − η) = s. And Stage 2 is where point N is on the right side of point C and point M is above point B,
Part of the line segment αη + β(1 − η) = s enters region R, so this part signifies that the complete security control condition can be reached. Hence the degree of complete security control is the ratio of the part of the line segment that has entered region R to the total line segment, 
